By Lucy Caldwell, Irish IB Student

There is a temptation to explain that the startling developments which took place during the reign of Alexander II came about because the 'Tsar Liberator', as he was nicknamed, recognised the desperate problems of the people and devoted his life to resolving them. The fact that less than six years elapsed between his accession to the throne and the emancipation of the serfs has made it easy for some historians and biographers to paint a glowing picture of the tragic hero struggling against adversary to bring relief to his people, assassinated in a cruel twist of fate the day before he was due to announce more major reforms. On the other hand, modern Western historians have tended to take the opposite view and argue that the 'Tsar Liberator' was an out-and-out autocrat who reluctantly imposed certain measures of change because it was obvious that his position was no longer sustainable unless something was done. It is hard to reach any sort of definitive conclusion, so antithetical are the various opinions and theories about the reign of Alexander II. Whereas the good Russian biographers have access to journals and letters not easily available to Western historians, their works tend to be somewhat hagiographical and it is difficult to discern whether or not the works of Western historians have been biased against Alexander II due to cultural differences and a background of Russophobia. Caution must also be exercised not to 'compartmentalize' people too much as history has a tendency of doing; for example regarding Nicholas I as a 'standard-bearer of uncompromising autocracy' (Norman Rich) and Alexander II as a liberal reformer. It can be misleading to try and label people or come to a simple conclusion.

Alexander II came to the throne in 1855, at a time when it was becoming painfully obvious that the Russian system as it was could not survive without change and reform. Serfdom, a bulwark of Russian society, had for half a century hampered and impaired growth and development in all sectors of Russian society. The growth of the home market was hindered, industry was restricted and it was impossible for Russia to implement the more progressive methods of capitalistic production of other European countries. The economy was not only impeded, it was beginning to suffer. Marx described war as 'the midwife of progress' and in practical terms Russia's humiliating defeat in the Crimean War had destabilized Russia's entire economy and finances as well as exposing the deficiencies and flaws which could no longer be ignored. What is more, the new philosophies born of the French Revolution had spread all over Europe, and had appeared in subdued forms even in Russia, despite the censorship and travel bans which previous rulers had imposed. As VV Zenkovsky relates in A History of Russian Philosophy, Volume I, Radicalism had already taken substantial shape during the final years of the reign of Nicholas I. Rousseau's theorem about the 'radical goodness of human nature' had made a considerable impression on Russian intellectuals and thinkers and this emphasized the importance of the individual. Russian nihilism, which flourished during the reign of Alexander II but was already growing before his accession, also exalted the individual and philosophers, already starting to think in terms of equality of mankind, were seeing deep flaws in Russian society, because the largest proportion were serfs with no rights and no freedom. With the Crimean War a unique movement of self-accusation was evoked and, according to VV Zenkovsky: the young people began to speak a language which had not previously been heard in Russia. A time had come when even the aristocratic bureaucracy realized that a pivotal point in history had been reached because unless they surrendered to the course of reform voluntarily, inevitability would drag them along and take away any aspect of control they might retain over events if they acted of their own will. The need for reforms had been resisted or ignored for too long and now if society was not changed from above it would change itself - by means of revolution - from below. As Alexander said in his famous speech to the Moscow nobles in April 1856: It is better to abolish serfdom from above then to wait for the time when it will begin to abolish itself from below.

The task which faced Alexander II was staggeringly complex. He was faced with the prospect of having to completely remodel the enormous state, abolish the age-old order founded on serfdom and with it change the whole structure of the country; the judicial system, fiscal system, administration - the list goes on, and by nature Alexander II was neither a liberal nor a reformer and was not by any account particularly intelligent or innovative. Yet history had placed on him the burden of the knowledge that change was a necessity if he wished to save Russia from calamity.

The first, biggest and by far the most important reform was the emancipation of the serfs, which came in 1861 following consideration and planning by several committees; incidentally, this was later exposed as being inconclusive, ineffective and ill-thought out. It was this reform, the greatest single liberating measure in modern history, (MS Anderson) which earned Alexander II his nickname of Tsar Liberator. The lateral impact of this reform was colossal as it necessitated a complete overhaul of Russian society. The secondary reforms triggered by emancipation were: the creation of a new system of local government - the zemstva - in 1864 and continued with a reorganization of municipal administration in 1870, a revision of the judicial system in 1864 and a modification of the military in 1874. (There were of course other more minor reforms such as the foundation of a state bank in 1860 and the building of an organized system of railways in 1877, but important as these were they pale in comparison with the groundbreaking major reforms.)

The Emancipation Edict (which, incidentally, came two years before President Lincoln's equivalent) actually made conditions worse for the peasants because it was so ill managed. The consequences of such an act had not been fully thought out and the first edict was not followed quickly by others giving the peasants complete personal freedom, outright land ownership or the means to acquire more land and cultivate it effectively. The basic principle of the edict had been that the serf was to be given land when he was freed. However, there was not enough land to allow every serf to support himself and yet the government imposed heavy taxes and debts on the serf; the idea being that the serf could pay for the land in instalments. This was impractical because many could not support themselves and their families on what they cultivated, let alone pay the government taxes. Ironically many were far worse off after emancipation than they had been before. No measures reached the basic problems of the peasantry until Stolypin's reforms in the early twentieth century and the 'mir', or peasant community, an outdated institution which should have been replaced by some form of commune or co-operative, survived until 1906. Indeed, the historian David Saunders says: A severe critic of the statutes of 1861 might respond to the question, 'Why did Alexander II free the serfs?' by saying that he failed to do so. Alexander Herzen, a contemporary writer for The Bell, published in London, was also a severe critic: Serfdom is not abolished at all... the Tsar betrayed his people. Emancipation not only failed the peasants, it angered the nobility from whom it had taken power and it led to bitter criticism of the Tsar concerning injustice in land allocation and compensation for land owners. What is more, it led to heightened antagonism towards the government on the part of intellectuals and philosophers.

Some historians have argued that the emancipation of the serfs was a major factor in the later industrial boom. However, skilled labour as a pose to the cheap masses was required, and often workers had to be hired from abroad to meet the needs of the slowly expanding industry.

There were fundamental flaws with the other reforms as well. The system of the zemstva, or local government, was theoretically plausible but did not work in reality - or rather, it worked too well. A scheme had been created whereby there was a zemstvo (local council) for each rural district. Within each zemstvo three classes were represented, the landowners, townspeople and peasants, with a voting system devised so that the lesser gentry would be predominant, thus ensuring that no radical decisions would be made by the proletariat. Each zemstvo was to have full responsibility for local roads, bridges, and poor relief and later on primary education and public health. As well as removing some of the heavy burden of governing from the Tsar, this measure of decentralization would allow local agitators for reform some responsibility in areas which were not essentially areas of potential political danger to the government. However, as the zenstva became successful with local government the members began to want a greater share of national power as a pose to merely regional or provincial power. Although they did not want to overthrow the national system, the suspicion of some leading figures was aroused and so a lot of reforms or changes - however minor - which the zemstva wanted to implement were officially blocked so that affairs stagnated. This was the wrong action for the government to take as it increased resentment and led to the zemstvo becoming lively centres of political agitation for frustrated would-be reformers. A lot of discontent might have been dissolved if the Tsar had agreed to the establishment of a central representative body in which the problems inherent in every reform could have been publicly addressed. It was not until the end of his reign when he accepted modest proposals for greater public involvement in central government, proposals which were never to become reality because Alexander II was assassinated hours before he was due to announce them and make them law.

The judicial measures were perhaps some of the most successful reforms. The entire legal code was revised according to Western principles and equality for all before the law, the right to a public trial and other basic ideas were recognized. However, extrajudicial authority still existed and many 'undesirables' were arrested and frequently deported without trial.

The military reforms were also largely successful. Military service was in theory compulsory for all classes although in reality the nobility could buy or bribe their way out of it and it was mostly the peasants who served. This was no bad thing however, as the infamous harsh discipline was revised and it was in the army that most peasants learnt to read and write and received the rudiments of an education. Service was reduced from 25 years to 6 years plus 9 years in the reserves and five in the militia. To the detriment of the government, however, it was chiefly in the army that peasants were exposed to revolutionary ideas and propaganda.

At the beginning of Alexander II's reign (the so-called 'honeymoon period') the cry had been 'Spring has come' because within the first few days the ban on foreign travel had been relaxed, foreign passports began to be issued and censorship was lightened. However, throughout Alexander II's reign policy vacillated to the frustration of the intellectuals and students, with censorship being first relaxed then reimposed, then slightly relaxed again, then reinserted even more strongly. As Saunders says, what the government gave away with one hand, it took back with the other. If there had been outlets for this discontent such as more freedom of the press and speech and opportunity for concurrence in political life, then it might have been dissipated and posed no threat to the government. As it was, many secret societies were formed, such as the populist Narodnaia Rasprava (The Peoples’ Justice) and Chernyi Peredel (Black Partition). Most illegal circles were in fact relatively innocuous and prepared naïve, idealistic plans which were never to come to anything. However, there were some hardcore revolutionaries who aspired to a radically different society with the complete overthrow and death of the Imperial family and monarchical system. There were many assassination attempts on Alexander II by these revolutionaries, culminating in the murder of the Tsar on 1 March 1881 in a bomb blast.

The problematic reforms and domestic affairs should have been given precedence over international affairs and Russia's overestimation of the importance of maintaining her position in the world at large exacerbated her difficulties. Alexander II, contrary to popular opinion, did not handle the Crimean War very well. He came to the throne in the midst of the war but did not try to bring it to a swift end, as some have written. To the contrary, he stated to ambassadors of Austria and Prussia that he would adhere to the late Tsar's principles and continue the war. After the fall of Sevastopol his orders to the Crimean Commander were to think of 1812 and trust in God. The foreign policy of the rest of his reign was to be equally unsuccessful. Russia was left after the Crimean War with no really beneficial allies and the relationship with France was broken after the Polish rebellion in 1863. Poland, France, Britain and Austria were all openly hostile to Russia and only America, who was too far away to be a useful ally at the time was tolerant, if not friendly. Affairs are confused but there seem to be three main discernible tactics - western (new ties with principal states of Europe which failed) eastern (enlarging Russian activity in Asia which led to moderate territorial gains but at the price of increased hostility) and southern (returning to the main area of the 1850's defeat; the Black Sea causes were abrogated and S Bessarabia was regained but this again led to more animosity from the Great Powers). Precedence should have been given to domestic problems, and Russia's failure to achieve anything substantial by means of her foreign policy accentuates this.

Thus it is relatively simple to assess the consequences of the actual reforms which Alexander II implemented. It is far harder to assess the 'Tsar Liberator' himself and come to any sort of conclusion regarding him. It is perhaps easier to begin to understand this complex character if some sort of psychological profile is sketched. The Tsar had absolute, almost god-like authority and so in Russian history especially the importance of personality and character is amplified.

Alexander II was better prepared for his accession to the throne than his father Nicholas I or his uncle Alexander I, neither of whom were expected to become Tsar. Nicholas I was a loving father and did not want his son to grow up with an overblown sense of self and so there were very few formalities or luxuries for le petit Sasha as Alexander was known. His companions were not allowed to call him by any formal titles and he slept on a hard, military-style bed and lived a strictly regimented lifestyle. This was designed to help keep him more in touch with reality. His tutors were chosen carefully and the most notable of them was VA Zhukovsky, a known poet and humanist. Zhukovsky came to Alexander's schoolroom in 1824 as a helper and observer rather than a teacher and he had the opportunity to judge the boy's character objectively before he became closely connected with him. In his memoirs Zhukovsky relates how he found the boy 'truthful, courteous and utterly unselfconscious', but inclined to timidity and laziness. He was not prepared to even try to overcome any obstacle in his way and if he found a lesson slightly hard to grasp, instead of trying to work it out he would despair and give up or else plunge into apathy and refuse to continue. A fundamental aspect of his character even from early childhood was his need for affection. On a certain occasion when one of his sisters failed to answer his letter by return post he became exceedingly upset and decided that she no longer loved him. It only took a brusque reply or a slight criticism to make him feel unwanted and disliked by the whole world. Throughout his childhood and youth he was prone to long periods of deep depression which would come back to shadow him in later life. It was at his father's coronation in 1826 that the little boy, then only 8 years old and riding through the streets as the Heir Apparent for the first time became aware of 'the masses' as a potential source of the adoration and approval which he so craved.

When Alexander was 19, his father sent him on a tour of Europe to educate him and a tour of Russia so that he could be acquainted with the Empire which would one day become his. Visiting the 'liberal' capitals of Western Europe and being shown the English parliamentary system with its dual Houses must surely have made its mark on him but the biggest impression was left on his mind by seeing the lives of some of the inhabitants of his own country. Nicholas I had carefully planned the route Alexander was to take but the small entourage made several unscheduled stops where Alexander visited several izbas, peasant huts. In some of the letters and journals of his retinue his taciturnity and quietness after such visits is remarked upon. After seeing the conditions of the convicts in Tobolsk (Siberia) he sent a passionate letter to his father demanding that something be done to ease the harshness of their life. In 1843, when acting as Regent in his father's absence, he is recorded as saying: Much must be done... Much must be changed... I must wait for my father's return... I will talk to Kisselev... so much must be changed... the penal system alone... and he is said to have hidden his face in his hands and wept; however, whether out of compassion for the serfs or for the sheer enormity of the task facing him it is not recorded.

EM Almedigen, in her biography of Alexander II, says that: Compassion for man's misery was the motive behind every reforming enterprise... and of the peasants: He loved them... all his reforms from first to last were aimed at improving their lot, enlightening their minds, doing away with so many harshnesses of the past. However, this is an example of the hagiography mentioned earlier. Reforms were a necessity, and Alexander II could see this plainly. It helped that he had seen the misery of the serfs and that he wished to do something, but his upbringing had been too firmly steeped in the autocratic regime for him, as a Tsar and a Romanov, to want to squander his position and riches for purely humanist reasons. He was fully aware that it was in Russia's best interests - which was, of course, synonymous with his own personal interests - to implement certain cautious measures of reform. As a child he had been taught that autocracy came from God. All things coming from God's hands were good, ergo there was virtue in autocracy. Another common contemporary belief was that no children would be born of serf marriages if God really wished the institution of serfdom to end. However, a lot of his friends and relatives were 'abolitionists' and his hunger for their approval and praise led him to do things which he might not otherwise have considered and so both personal reasons and the pressing need for immediate change made him determined that serfdom had to be abolished.

This was no new idea; both Alexander I and Nicholas I had set up secret committees to discuss ways of abolishing serfdom. No action came form these, however, and it might have been the same for Alexander II had circumstances not been different. Even the 'hagiographers' do not pretend that Alexander II was particularly intelligent, and Fedor Tiutchev said that: When the Emperor talks to an intellectual he has the appearance of someone with rheumatism who is standing in a draught. Tiutchev was a poet, so this slightly excessive view should be treated warily, but certainly Alexander II was no intellectual or innovator. However, buoyed by both the enthusiasm of friends and the desire to win respect and praise and coupled with the grim knowledge that his living was dependant on immediate action, he started preparing and researching. Committees were established to look at how the issue of emancipation should be addressed and a big question was whether or not the serfs should be freed with land.

Alexander II was conscientious in his personal preparations. He read aloud to his wife books of history and law and Raditchev's Journey from St Petersburg to Moscow, the controversial book about the plight of the peasant, the author of which had been condemned to prison under Catherine the Great. He also had letters from Zhukovsky which said things such as: Slavery is abhorrent in God's eyes and runs counter to His truth. However, there were also many opposing voices which ordinarily might have caused Alexander II to vacillate in his decision; it was probably only the need for change which kept him firmly set on the course of emancipation. Contrary to Zhukovsky's opinion was the view of Philaret, the influential Metropolitan of Moscow who held that serfdom and God's covenant were not incompatible (there were 3 million Church serfs). Many of the aristocracy argued that freeing the serfs was dangerous and would lead to the total collapse of the country; it was a pity that the mismanagement of the whole scheme led to their increased hostility. Kisselev recorded in his journal: I could see that the Tsar was firmly determined to go on with the abolition of serfdom, but he is hampered on every side.

Alexander II wrote to his friend General Rostovtsev in October 1859: I am too convinced of the rightness of this sacred enterprise that we have instituted that anyone can stop me short of its completion. When emancipation came two years later, Alexander II was convinced that he had done the right thing. General Cherbachev relates in his memoirs the events of the day the edict was proclaimed: At 2 in the morning the Tsarina Meadow was crowded... Suddenly the Emperor came riding back... At once hats and caps flew into the air and it seemed as though the very ground under our feet was shaking, so thundering were the cheers and the hurrahs... No pen could describe the rapture of the people as the Tsar rode past... On his return to the Palace, the Emperor went to his little daughter's room and, his face radiant, kissed her and said: 'Today is the happiest day of my life.' This love and adulation was exactly what the Tsar had craved since he was a little boy. However, the indolence and myopia of the administration meant that these feelings quickly evaporated. The somewhat mythical view abounded amongst the peasants that freedom brought with it a kind of Utopia, and things quickly turned sour when this was not discovered to be the case and things were in fact, if not worse, then just the same as before. There were increased riots and disturbances by peasants who had misunderstood the terms of the Edict and this was compounded by the anger of not only those of the landowners and nobility who had always opposed emancipation but those previously in favour who now felt that they had lost a substantial amount of their status or wealth and were not being duly compensated. All this embittered the Tsar. It had always been a 'no win' situation and there was no way that he could have satisfied everyone but, as always overly sensitive to criticism, he became depressed and atrophic again, convinced of the helplessness of the situation. There were further reforms because of the necessity for change, but none of the sources document the same enthusiasm which Alexander II seems to have felt at first. This partly explains why he was reluctant to introduce more reforms and why historians have levelled at him the charge that he tried to block reforms. The Tsar was also criticized for delays in implementing the reforms, but this is perhaps not a totally fair charge because, as one of the old clerks of the legal courts said, the law is not a hare.

Contrary to the former accusations, however, Alexander II does seem to have remained more open-minded to the possibility of further reforms than he has been given credit for. He himself said to DG Golokhvastov, a Marshal of Nobility: I give you my word of honour that I would be prepared at this very moment, at this very table, to sign the Constitution Manifesto if I were convinced of it doing good to the country. But I know that if I were to do it today, Russia would fall to pieces tomorrow.

Circumstances seemed against the possibility of Alexander II making any further reforms, however. It seemed that it had been the abandonment of his father's vigilance which had led to the Polish rebellion of 1863 and already disillusioned with the consequences of the Emancipation Edict the Tsar became world-weary after the death of his eldest son in 1865, the first attempt to assassinate him in 1866 and all the subsequent attacks. In this same year Prussia's victory over Austria highlighted the shifting balance of power in Europe and the lessening of Russia's influence in this sphere. DA Milutin, the liberal Minister of War commented in his diary: How striking and regrettable is a comparison with the circumstances with which I entered the cabinet thirteen years ago. Then the Tsar sympathized with progress and moved forward himself. Now he has lost faith in everything that he has done, in all who surround him, even in himself. It seems that Alexander II had inherited part of the Romanov weakness of character, present in both his uncle Alexander I and his grandfather Paul I. As circumstances changed and his personal life became more fraught with danger, he halted or slowed the reforming process. This 'go slowly - stop quickly' reform process is obvious in a study of nineteenth century Russian history. Alexander II had always been greatly influenced by Zhukovsky, and following the 1848 revolutions, when Alexander was acting as Regent, even Zhukovsky, the great humanist, turned to reaction and advised the banning of the mere word 'reform'. With frequent attempts on his life and the ever-increasing problems emerging from the attempt to reform something which was perhaps unreformable (even today the former Soviet Union is notorious for its backward society and large class-gap and the governments are still struggling) it is no wonder that the Tsar lost heart and faith in the potential for reform to solve problems.

The two main controversies which surround Tsar Alexander II centre on whether or not he deserves the title 'Tsar Liberator' and if his reign was a success or a failure. It must be pointed out that it is possible that he does merit the nickname 'Liberator' yet his reign was not very successful and it is also possible that although he should not be considered a Liberator he was still successful in what he did. It is also easy to underestimate the size of the task which he undertook and perhaps it was impossible to find a solution; as mentioned the state of modern Russia supports this view. It is also possible that any assessment of his reign is overshadowed by the end and the following reign of Alexander III. Alexander II was assassinated by revolutionary terrorists who mistakenly believed that his death would trigger more far-reaching reforms, but instead there was a reactionary backlash against reform. "If he had lived one more day" is a somewhat idealistic view because judging by the previous reform record the new 'parliament' would probably not ultimately been 'the' solution, as it is sometimes seen today. It would not have been humanly possible to transform the Empire within one lifetime. Alexander II had a habit of vacillating and the onset of depression brought to a halt the steady stream of progress with which his reign opened, yet neither of these facts can detract wholly from the fact that it was his reforms which prolonged the life of the monarchy in Russia and finally dragged Russia into the nineteenth century. With regard to the 'Tsar Liberator' question it must be borne in mind that the modern Western perception of 'liberal' and a 'liberator' differs greatly from what it would have been in Russia nearly a century and a half ago. It could be argued that Alexander II was no more a liberator than was his father; the language of Alexander's famous speech about emancipation is no more radical than that of Nicholas in 1842, defending the ineffectual Law On Obligated Peasants. Whether Alexander II was an 'Enlightened Despot' or whether he was swept along by a tide of reform which he was unable to resist, (the truth is probably that he was a mix of both) the fact remains that although the system ultimately failed, in purely practical terms Alexander II was a 'Liberator' because it was he who actually signed the Emancipation Edict. Nevertheless, however great a role circumstances played in forcing him to act, no other Russian ruler in approximately the same period brought - or attempted to bring - so much relief to the people.